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We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan 
contracts. We develop a theoretical model incorporating information asymmetries 
in a spatial competition framework where banks choose between screening the 
borrower and asking for collateral. We show that presence of collateral is more 
likely when bank competition is low. We then test this prediction empirically on a 
sample of bank loans from 70 countries. We estimate logit models where the 
presence of collateral is regressed on bank competition, measured by the Lerner 
index. Our empirical tests corroborate the theoretical predictions that bank 
competition reduces the use of collateral. These findings survive several 
robustness checks. 
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Kilpailun vaikutukset pankkien vakuuspolitiikkaan 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 27/2008 
Christa Hainz – Laurent Weill – Christophe J. Godlewski 




Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan pankkien välisen kilpailun vaikutuksia niiden 
myöntämien luottojen vakuuskäytäntöihin. Työn teoreettisen osan analyysi perus-
tuu epäsymmetrisellä informaatiolla täydennettyyn spatiaalisen kilpailun malliin. 
Siinä pankit valintansa mukaan joko seulovat laina-asiakkaansa tai vaativat 
vakuuksia myöntämilleen lainoille. Mallin mukaan vakuuksien käyttö on todennä-
köisempää, kun pankkien välinen kilpailu on vähäistä. Tätä mallin implikaatiota 
testataan työn empiirisessä osassa hyödyntämällä 70 maan aineistoa pankkien 
myöntämistä lainoista. Estimoivassa logit-mallissa pankkien vakuuksien käytön 
todennäköisyyttä selitetään pankkien välistä kilpailua mittaavalla ns. Lerner-
indeksillä. Estimointitulokset tukevat teoreettisen mallin keskeistä implikaatiota, 
että vakuuksien käyttö vähenee, kun pankkien välinen kilpailu kiristyy. 
 
Avainsanat: vakuudet, pankkien välinen kilpailu, epäsymmetrinen informaatio 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, D43, D82  
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Following the significant structural changes of the banking industry witnessed 
around the globe, much theoretical and empirical work has examined the 
economic role of bank competition in recent years.
1 Among others, the impact of 
bank competition on the access to bank finance has been investigated, as benefits 
from bank competition are intuitively expected from lower loan rates which 
should favor this access (eg Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004). 
  Nevertheless, the role of bank competition on the access to bank finance also 
depends on its effects on collateral use, as collateral requirements are repeatedly 
mentioned as a major financing obstacle. For instance, by relying on the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) survey for firms in 80 countries, Beck et 
al (2006) report that collateral requirements are rated as the third most important 
obstacle among 12 financing obstacles, just after high interest rates and access to 
long-term loans. One can therefore wonder how bank competition influences the 
use of collateral. 
  However research on the effect of bank competition on collateral is 
impressively poor. To investigate this effect, we develop a theoretical model with 
asymmetric information about the firm’s creditworthiness. Banks can solve the 
resulting adverse selection problem either by screening or by collateralization. 
With a screening contract banks have to incur costs, that increase in the distance 
to the firm, to get a perfect signal on the creditworthiness. Since they can observe 
the firm’s location, they are able to price-discriminate. With a collateralized 
contract firms self-select themselves, but costs arise if collateralized assets are 
liquidated. 
  We show that firms that are located close to a bank are financed by a 
screening contract and those further away by a collateralized contract. The reason 
is that the banks offer the most cost-efficient contract and screening costs are low 
for those firms that are close to the bank. As the number of banks increases and 
competition intensifies the fraction of firms financed by a screening contract 
increases. 
  We then test empirically our theoretical predictions with a cross-country 
analysis on a sample of 4931 bank loans from 70 countries. We perform logit 
regressions of the presence of collateral on bank competition. Bank competition is 
measured by the Lerner index, which infers bank’ conduct directly and then 
informs on the actual behavior of the bank. The empirical analysis confirms the 
model’s prediction that bank competition decreases the use of collateral. 
  There are a few papers about the relationship between bank competition and 
collateralization. The theoretical papers study how either the adverse selection or 
                                                 
1 See the special issue of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking in 2004 (vol. 36, no. 3) on this 
topic.  
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the moral hazard problem is solved by collateralization. Manove, Padilla and 
Pagano (2001) use a model in which banks choose between screening the 
borrower and asking the latter to pledge collateral. In their model, the bank gets a 
signal whether a firm will repay or not through screening but only a signal about 
their probability to repay through collateralization. Competing banks offer 
different contracts that allow firms with a high probability to repay to collateralize 
which is more attractive to them than a screening contract. However, socially it 
would be beneficial to have all firms screened and the monopolistic bank as a 
residual claimant would screen them. Thus, the paper predicts that borrowers are 
more likely to post collateral in competitive markets than in monopolistic markets. 
  Berlin and Butler (2002) develop a model based on the possibility of 
renegotiation between the bank and the borrower. This renegotiation can take 
place after the completion of the initial loan contract and depends on new 
information obtained by the bank. They support the view that bank competition 
leads to lower collateral requirements, which results from the incentives of the 
bank to proceed to renegotiation. Both former models consider the role of 
collateral in solving adverse selection problems, and offer opposing predictions. 
  In contrast, Hainz (2003) proposes a model in which collateral helps solving 
moral hazard problems. At the same time, collateral can be used to extract rent 
from borrowers. Through collateralization the payoff of the firm in the case of 
failure is reduced. This allows the bank to demand a higher repayment in the case 
of success, without destroying the firm’s incentives. This model predicts that 
competition reduces the use of collateral. 
  On the empirical side, two recent papers can be related to the impact of bank 
competition on the use of collateral, although they do not focus on this issue. 
Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) investigate a wide range of determinants of the 
presence of collateral on a large sample of loans granted by Spanish banks. They 
notably analyze the impact of bank concentration, measured by the Herfindahl 
index, and find a negative impact of bank concentration on collateral use. Berger 
et al (2007) test whether the adoption of a lending technology reducing ex ante 
information asymmetries, ie small business credit scoring, is associated with 
lower collateral use in loan contracts in the US. Bank concentration measured by 
the Herfindahl index is included as a control variable. They find no significant 
sign for bank concentration to explain the incidence of collateral in their 
estimations. 
  We can thus point out that the theoretical literature provides conflicting 
predictions which lack of empirical tests to their validation. The aim of this paper 
is to provide a broad and consistent analysis of the role of bank competition on the 
use of collateral, based on theoretical and empirical investigation. In an innovative 
theoretical explanation, we incorporate information asymmetries in an industrial 
organization framework. Our theoretical model is related to Manove, Padilla and 
Pagano (2001) but we differ from this model in two major aspects. The first  
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difference concerns the fact that banks are not lazy in our model, in the sense that 
there is no additional information on the borrower that the bank can obtain. The 
second difference is the modeling of the market structure. Following recent 
theoretical works on bank competition (eg Dell’Arricia, 2001; Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006), we consider a spatial competition framework based on a circular 
economy. Such representation is closer to the reality of banking markets, marked 
more by differentiation, than monopoly or oligopoly. That geographical distance 
shapes lending rates of banks is empirically shown by Degryse and Ongena 
(2005). 
  We also depart from the empirical studies in two important respects. We do 
not focus on a single country for our study which may lead to country-specific 
results but we perform a cross-country analysis. By measuring bank competition 
with the Lerner index we infer the banks’ conduct directly, which is in line with 
the recent empirical works on bank competition (Martin, Salas and Saurina, 2006; 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, 2007). Thereby, we do not have to rely 
on concentration measures that infer the degree of competition from indirect 
proxies such as market shares. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical model. In section 3, we develop the empirical results. We finally 
provide some concluding remarks in section 4. 
 
 
2 Theoretical  model 
2.1  Set up of the model 
We start by describing the characteristics of the firms possibly applying for a loan 
and the banking sector. Firms want to undertake an investment project that costs I. 
Due to the lack of own liquid funds, the firms need to finance their investment 
through credit. The firm’s owners are endowed with an asset A  >  I that can 
potentially be offered as collateral. 
  There exists a continuum of firms the number of which is normalized to 1. 
Firms are distributed uniformly around a circle of length 1. The fraction of good 
firms is μ and that of bad firms is (1–μ). The good firms have a project that is 
successful with probability p. In the case of success, the project’s payoff is X, in 
the case of failure it is 0. Thus, the expected payoff of a good firm is pX – I > 0, 
which we assume to be positive. Bad firms will fail with probability 1. If bad 
firms receive a loan, they take the money and run. Since there are no costs of 
application, both good and bad firms apply for loans. 
  We consider a banking sector with N identical banks that are located 




. Banks compete in repayments. They cannot observe the firm’s type, ie 
whether a particular firm is good or bad. However, they know the distribution of 
good and bad firms. Moreover, banks can observe the firm’s location. Having this 
information allows a bank to price-discriminate because it can make the offer 
contingent on the firm’s location. We assume that banks possess enough funds to 
finance all firms that apply for loans and that the firms’ returns (and in the case of 
collateralization their assets) are high enough such that the market is covered. 
  Banks have two means to discriminate between good and bad firms: they 
either offer a collateralized credit contract which induces firms to signal their 
type, or they screen all firms applying for credit by evaluating their credit 
proposals. In the case of screening, banks receive a perfect signal about a firm’s 
creditworthiness. The screening costs c are proportional to the distance d between 
bank and firm, ie the further away a firm is located from a bank, the higher are the 
screening cost. The idea is that the bank already possesses more costless 
information if a firm is located close-by because, for instance, through a 
relationship it can observe the firm’s daily business, quality of management or 
competitive position. Consequently, the effort the bank has to incur to get a 
perfect signal is lower.
2 Alternatively, distance could be interpreted as a measure 
for the strength of the relationship between the bank and the firm. A screening 
contract is viable because we assume that even with financing a firm that is 




c I pX ≥ − − . 
  In the case of collateralization, the bank gets a payoff from the collateralized 
assets that are liquidated if the project fails. There are costs associated with 
liquidation. Therefore, the liquidation value of each unit of collateral, denoted by 
α, is lower than the continuation value of the firm, ie, α < 1. We want to render 
collateralization a viable option if the competitor offers a screening contract. 
Therefore we assume that at least for the customer that is located half-way 
between two banks, the costs of a collateralized contract are below those of a 
screening contract, ie 
N 2
c
I ) 1 )( p 1 ( < α − − . Moreover, we assume that for firms 
located closer to the bank that offers the screening contract, screening is a viable 
option by assuming  I ) 1 )( p 1 (
N 4
c
α − − < . Note that offering a contract without 
either screening or collateralization does not pay off, because we assume that 
μpX – I < 0. 
                                                 
2 Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) provide empirical evidence that distance matters for the 
informativeness of a signal. We capture the impact of distance not on the informativeness of the 
signal (as in Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) but on the costs needed to generate a perfect signal.  
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  The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, banks decide 
simultaneously which type of contract they offer. In the second stage, banks 
determine simultaneously the terms of the credit contract they offer. Firms apply 
at the bank which offers the contract with the most favourable terms. We assume 
that if banks offer the same repayments, firms apply at the closest bank.
3 Finally, 
payoffs are realized. 
  We solve the game by backward induction. Thus, we first analyse the contract 
terms for a situation in which either both banks offer the same type of contract or 
different types of contracts. In a second step, we show when a particular contract 
is optimal. 
  In our model, each firm has two banks that are in its neighbourhood. We 
denote the bank that is closest to the firm as bank 1 and the other bank as bank 2. 
Without loss of generality, we can restrict our analysis to the competition between 
one bank and its nearest competitor. Thus, we analyze competition for firms that 






; 0 d  from bank 1. 
 
 
2.2 Collateralized credit contract 
We first suppose that all banks offer a collateralized credit contract. Firms 
compare the repayments announced by the bank and choose the contract with the 
most favourable terms. Collateralization implies that the firm repays an amount 
R
L in the case of success and that it loses collateral in the amount L in the case of 
failure. The credit contract has to be designed in a way that the bad firms have no 
incentive to demand credit. This is reached through collateralization. The 
incentive compatibility constraint for a bad firm can be written as 
 
) L _ BF . IC ( I L





If a bad firm receives a loan in the amount of I (and runs away with the money), it 
will lose assets in the amount of L as the project fails with certainty. Therefore, it 
is obvious that the amount of collateral that prevents bad firms from applying for 
credit is I. As a result, bad firms do not apply for loans. Moreover, the good firm 
has to be as well off with a loan as without a loan, ie 
A ) I A )( p 1 ( ) R X A ( p
L ≥ − − + − + . Finally, the bank must be willing to offer a 
contract because its participation constraint is fulfilled as well, ie 
                                                 
3 We would obtain the same qualitative result if firms had to incur some cost of application.  
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0 I I ) p 1 ( pR
L ≥ − − α + . The results are summarized in the following lemma 
where Π
L denotes the bank’s expected profits: 
 
Lemma 1: With a collateralized contract, each bank demands 
p
) ) p 1 ( 1 (
I R
L α − −




. Each bank makes zero expected profits. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Banks have identical cost structures because the liquidation value of collateral is 
the same for all. This means that there is perfect competition between banks 
which drives their profits down to zero. They all demand the same repayments 
and therefore they serve firms up to the marginal customer which is located half-
way between a bank and its competitor. No bank has an incentive to demand a 
higher repayment because then it would lose the customer. It does not have an 
incentive to undercut either because then it would make a loss. The repayment is 
determined by the bank’s participation constraint. Note that the firm’s 
participation constraint is fulfilled because otherwise collateralization would not 
be a viable option. 
 
 
2.3 Screening  contract 
We next suppose that all banks offer a screening contract. The distance to bank 1 
is d, the one to bank 2 is  d
N
1
− . The bank demands a repayment R
S in the case of 
success and zero otherwise, because the owner’s personal assets are not pledged 
as collateral. To break even, the bank needs a repayment of R
S that is determined 
by its participation constraint which is (where subscripts 1, 2 are used to denote 
the bank) 
 
) S _ 1 B . PC ( 0 cd I pR
S
1 ≥ − −   for bank 1 and 










⎛ − − −   for bank 2 
 
Banks can price-discriminate and they marginally undercut the competitors offer. 
Since we assume that firms take the loan from the closest bank, this implies that 
bank 1 demands the same repayment as bank 2. We summarize the result in the 
following lemma.  
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S  and serves all firms up to a distance of 
N 2
1
. Each bank 
makes an expected profit per customer of  dc 2
N
c S − = Π . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Since banks can price-discriminate the repayment they demand depends on the 
firm’s outside option. This outside option is to take a loan from bank 2. The 
further away is bank 2 the higher the repayment bank 2 needs to break-even. This 
implies that a firm has to repay more the closer it is located to bank 1. This 
paradoxical situation is due to the hold-up problem which the firm faces and is 
supported by empirical evidence (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). In equilibrium, 
each bank serves all customers up to the one that is located half-way between the 
bank and its competitor. Banks can extract rents and thereby make positive 
expected profits per customer that decrease for more distant customers. Distance 
influences the bank’s profit through two channels. First, the further away a firm 
from bank 1, the lower the repayment demanded by bank 2. Second, for these 




2.4  One bank screens, the other bank collateralizes 
We first study the case in which bank 1 offers a screening contract and bank 2 a 
collateralized contract (therefore we use the superscript SL to denote by S (L) that 
bank 1 (2) offers a screening (collateralized) contract). Then a firm that is located 
at a distance d from bank 1 has the outside option of getting a collateralized credit 
contract from bank 2. It depends on the the firm’s location which contract is the 
least costly. The results are summarized in the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 3: Suppose bank 1 offers a screening contract and bank 2 a collateralized 
contract. Bank 1 serves firms that are located at a distance 
c





≡ ≤  
through a screening contract with 
p




α − − +
= . With each of these 
firms bank 1 makes an expected profit per customer of  cd I ) 1 )( p 1 (
SL
1 − α − − = Π . 












2 + =  and L = I. With each firm bank 2 makes an 
expected profit per customer of  I ) 1 )( p 1 ( cd
SL
2 α − − − = Π . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
The firm has the outside option to demand a collateralized credit contract from 
bank 2. Bank 2 offers a contract that breaks even (see Lemma 1). Given this offer, 
bank 1 has to decide which repayment to demand. For firms that are located close 
to bank 1, bank 1 has low screening costs and it can match the expected 
repayment that bank 2 demands for a collateralized contract. This repayment is 
higher than the repayment bank 1 needs to break even. With these firms, bank 1 
makes positive expected profits. The closer a firms is located to the bank, the 
lower are the bank’s screening costs and the higher is its profit. 
  However, for firms that are located further away from bank 1 the screening 
costs can exceed the costs of a collateralized contract. Thus, bank 2 has a cost 
advantage and can match bank 1’s offer. These firms will choose the 
collateralized contract and be financed by bank 2. With these firms, bank 2 makes 
positive expected profits. The profits per customer are higher the further away the 
firm is from bank 1 because the hold-up problem the firms face (by bank 2) is 
more severe. 
  Next, we study a situation in which bank 1 offers a collateralized contract and 












S  to 
break even when serving a customer that is located at a distance d from bank 1. 
The result is as follows: 
 
Lemma 4: Suppose bank 1 offers a collateralized contract and bank 2 a screening 
contract. Bank 1 finances firms in a distance 
N 2
1
















+ =  and L  =  I. It makes expected profits of 










⎛ − = Π . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
The firms we are looking at are located at a distance more of than 
N 2
1
 from bank 
2. This implies that it is rather costly for bank 2 to screen and, consequently, the  
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repayment must be sufficiently high to cover these screening costs. As a result, 
bank 1 can win the competition by matching bank 2’s offer. The closer a firm is to 
bank 1, the higher is the repayment bank 2 needs to break even and the worse is 
the firm’s outside option. For bank 1 these firms are particularly profitable 
because for them the hold-up problem is most severe. Therefore, bank 1’s profit 
decreases in the distance to the firm. 
 
 
2.5  Comparison of contracts 
Solving the game by backward induction, we next identify the contracts that are 
offered by banks. Therefore, we look for the Nash equilibrium and we get the 
following result for the contracts through which a firm is financed: 
 
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, firms that are located at a distance of 
c





≡ ≤  are financed by a screening contract. Firms that are located 
further away are financed by a collateralized contract. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
When deriving the Nash equilibrium, we find that given that the other bank offers 
a collateralized credit contract, offering a screening contract is a (weakly) 
dominant strategy. However, the best response of a bank to the competitor 
offering a screening contract depends on the distance of the firm to which this 
contract is offered. For bank 1 this means that the best response is to offer a 
screening contract for all firms up to a distance of d
~
 and the (weakly) best 
response is to offer a collateralized contract for those firms that are located further 
away. For bank 2 the (weakly) best response if bank 1 offers a screening contract, 
is to offer a screening contract as well as long as d is below another threshold 
d
~
d ˆ >  and to offer a collateralized contract for those firms that are located further 
away. 
  The Nash equilibrium is that both banks offer a screening contract if  d
~
d ≤  
and firms are financed by bank 1. For  d ˆ d d
~
≤ < , the weakly dominant strategy of 
bank 1 (bank 2) is to offer a collateralized (screening) contract. As a result, firms 






< < , both banks offer collateralized contracts and firms are 
financed by bank 1. 
  We use this result to study the impact of bank competition on collateralization 
and find that:  
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Proposition 2: The fraction of firms financed by a collateralized contract 
decreases as the banking sector becomes more competitive, ie N is higher. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Up to the threshold d
~
 firms are screened. This threshold does not change with the 
number of banks. However, as the number of banks increases, the distance 
between banks decreases. This means that the ‘range’ in which collateralized 
contract are offered shrinks. As a result, the fraction of screening contracts among 
all contracts increases. 
 
 
3 Empirical  evidence 
The theoretical model shows that greater bank competition lowers collateral 
requirements. We now bring empirical evidence to bear on this issue. We first 
describe data and variables, before explaining how we measure bank competition. 
We then develop the empirical results. 
 
 
3.1  Data and variables 
The sample of bank loans is obtained from the Dealscan database, which is 
supplied by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). This database is 
commonly used in empirical studies on bank loans (eg Dahiya et al, 2003; Bharath 
et al, 2007; Qian and Strahan, 2007). 
  We use loan data for the period January 2000 to December 2005 as it is the 
period with the best coverage for both loans and banks. Following Qian and 
Strahan (2007), we drop loans to firms from the financial industry (SIC 6) and 
from the public sector (SIC 9). Public ownership or the monopoly situation is 
likely to influence the risk of loans granted to these firms, which may bias the use 
of collateral in comparison to what would be observed in manufacturing and other 
services. These criteria produced a sample of 4,931 bank loans made to borrowers 
located in 70 countries. A list of countries is displayed in table 1. 
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Table 1.   List of countries 
 
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovakia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
Venezuela, Viet Nam. 
 
 
The focus of our research is to investigate the relationship between the presence 
of collateral and the degree of bank competition. To this end, we proceed to 
regressions of the presence of collateral on a set of variables including bank 
competition and a wide range of control variables including loan-level and 
country-level variables. 
  The explained variable is the presence of collateral, which is measured by a 
dummy variable (Collateral) equal to one if the loan is secured and to zero if it is 
not. The explanatory variable of primary concern is the Lerner index (Lerner 
Index), measuring bank competition. We use the mean Lerner index for each 
country. Its computation is described in the next subsection. Bank-level data are 
taken from the ‘Bankscope’ database of BVD-IBCA. 
  We use five loan-level control variables to take loan characteristics into 
account. These include information on loan maturity (Maturity), and on the type 
of loan, which is controlled through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is a 
term loan and otherwise to zero (Loan Type)
4 We also control for the number of 
lenders involved in the loan by measuring the logarithm of the number of lenders 
(Number of Lenders), following Qian and Strahan (2007). We also take into 
account information on loan size (Loan Size), which is defined as the amount of 
the loan facility in thousand dollars. Finally, the presence of covenants in the loan 
contracts is controlled through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan contract 
includes covenants and otherwise to zero (Covenants). 
  We also use five country-level variables to take into account financial and 
economic development, and the legal environment. Financial Development is the 
ratio of the volume of credit to private enterprises to GDP. That ratio measures the 
extent to which credit is allocated to private firms. It is widely used in the 
empirical literature to proxy for the development of financial intermediaries (eg 
Beck and Levine, 2004). Bank Costs is defined as the mean ratio of overhead 
costs to total assets for all banks. Information comes from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt 
                                                 
4 A term loan is defined in Dealscan as an instalment loan where amounts repaid may not be 
reborrowed.  
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and Levine (2000) for these both variables. Economic Development is defined as 
the logarithm of GDP per capita, with data coming from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
  Following a large body of research on law and finance pioneered by La Porta 
et al (1997), we also adopt two variables for the impact of legal environment. 
Protection of creditor rights (Creditor Rights) is measured with the index 
developed by La Porta et al (1998) and updated by Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer (2007). This index is scored on a scale from zero to four with a higher 
score indicating better protection. It considers four aspects of the protection of 
creditor rights. Law enforcement is measured with the ‘Rule of Law’ index 
provided by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) on a yearly basis (Rule of 
Law). This indicator refers to ‘the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society’. It ranges from –2.5 to 2.5 with greater values 
associated with better law enforcement. 
  Dummy variables for each industry (for each 1-digit SIC code) and each year 
are also included in the estimations to control for industry and year effects. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in table 2. 
 
Table 2.   Variable and summary statistics 
 
Means and standard deviations for variables used in subsequent estimations. Sources: 
Dealscan for all loan characteristics; Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2000) for 
Financial Development, Bank Costs and Bank Concentration; World Development 
Indicators for Economic Development; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) for Rule 
of Law; Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) for Creditor Rights; own computations for 
Lerner Index. 
 
Variable Description  Mean  Std  Dev. 
Loan characteristics    
Collateral  Loan is secured (1=yes)  0.498  0.500 
Maturity  Maturity of the loan in months  61.672  42.641 
Loan size  Logarithm of the loan size ($000)  200.546  533.497 
Number of lenders  Logarithm of the number of lenders  1.317  1.022 
Loan type  Loan is a term loan (1=yes)  0.405  0.491 
Covenants  Loan includes covenants (1=yes)  0.278  0.448 
Country-level variables    
Lerner index  Mean Lerner index  13.927  9.538 
Economic development  Logarithm of GDP per capita in PPP  9.758  0.779 
Financial development  Ratio of credit to private sector to GDP  1.016  0.369 
Bank costs  Mean ratio of overhead costs to assets  0.027  0.013 
Creditor rights  Index of creditors rights from 0 (weak) to 4 
(strong) 
2.440 1.061 
Rule of law  Measure of ‘the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society’ from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
0.910 0.806 





3.2  The measurement of bank competition 
Empirical research on the measurement of bank competition provides several 
tools, which can be divided into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and 
the new empirical IO approaches. The traditional IO approach proposes tests of 
market structure to assess bank competition based on the Structure Conduct 
Performance (SCP) model. The SCP hypothesis argues that greater concentration 
causes less competitive bank conduct and leads to greater profitability of the 
bank.
5 According to this, competition can be measured by concentration indices 
such as the market share of the largest banks, or by the Herfindahl index. These 
tools were widely applied until the 1990s. 
  The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent 
the problems of the measures of competition provided by the traditional IO 
approach. These latter measures suffer from the fact that they infer the degree of 
competition from indirect proxies such as market structure or market shares. In 
comparison, non-structural measures do not infer the competitive conduct of 
banks through the analysis of market structure, but rather measure banks’ conduct 
directly. 
  Following new empirical IO approach, we compute the Lerner index for each 
bank of our sample, and then measure bank competition for each country by the 
mean Lerner index. The Lerner index has been computed in several recent studies 
on bank competition (eg Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, 2007; Martin, 
Saurina and Salas, 2006). It is defined as the difference between the price and the 
marginal cost, divided by the price. 
  The price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production 
(proxied by total assets) as the ratio of total revenues to total assets, following 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004). The marginal cost is estimated on the 
basis of a translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input 
prices (price of labor, price of physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). One 
cost function is estimated for each year to allow technology to change over time. 
We impose the restriction of linear homogeneity in input prices by normalizing 
total costs and input prices by one input price. The cost function is specified as 
follows 
 
                                                 
5 This can lower performance in terms of social welfare because higher interest rates worsen the 
firm’s incentives (Schnitzer, 1999).  
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where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w1 the price of labor (the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets),
6 w2 the price of physical capital (the ratio of 
other non-interest expenses to fixed assets), w3 the price of borrowed funds (the 
ratio of paid interests to all funding). Total costs are the sum of personnel 
expenses, other non-interest expenses and paid interest. The indices for each bank 
have been dropped from the presentation for the sake of simplicity. The estimated 




As the dependent variable, the presence of collateral, is a binary variable, we 
perform logit regressions following Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) and Berger 
et al (2007).
7 We estimate four logit regressions of the use of collateral by testing 
different combinations of control variables. The first regression includes all loan-
level and country-level control variables (column 1). The second one includes no 
country-level control variable (column 2). The third one skips the legal variables 
(Creditor Rights and Rule of Law) (column 3), while the fourth one skips the 
economic and financial variables (Economic Development, Financial 
Development, Bank Costs) (column 4). In computing standard errors, we cluster 
by borrower. 
  The major finding is the positive coefficient of Lerner Index, which is 
significant at the 1% level in all regressions. We therefore observe that the 
presence of collateral is more likely when the degree of bank competition is 
lower. As a consequence, our estimations clearly support our theoretical 
prediction on the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral. This result 
is in sharp contrast with the negative link between bank concentration and 
collateral use observed by Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) or the absence of 
                                                 
6 As Bankscope database does not provide information on the number of employees, we use this 
proxy variable for the price of labor following Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004, 2007). 
7 We adopt the logit model rather the probit model, because Akaike and Schwarz information 
criteria are lower in logit regressions. However, we have also performed the probit regressions as 
as robustness check, and found similar results.  
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link between both variables obtained by Berger et al (2007). However, these 
studies focus on one single country and use concentration indices to measure bank 
competition, which limit their relevance for the investigation of the role of bank 
competition on the presence of collateral. 
  Regarding the loan-level control variables, the coefficient is significantly 
positive for Maturity, Number of Lenders, Loan Type, and Covenants, while it is 
significantly negative for Loan Size. Our results thus suggest that a loan is more 
likely to be secured when it has a longer maturity, a greater number of lenders, 
some covenants, or when it is a term loan. In the opposite, larger loans are less 
likely to be secured. These findings are in line with the empirical literature 
showing that riskier loans are more likely to be secured (eg Jimenez and Saurina, 
2004). 
  Regarding the country-level variables, we find a positive and significant 
influence for Bank Costs and Creditor Rights, suggesting that banks with higher 
costs and benefiting from better protection of creditor rights ask more for 
collateral. The coefficient for Rule of Law is negative but only significant in one 
specification.  Economic Development and Financial Development are not 
significant in the estimations. These findings are consistent with Qian and Strahan 
(2007) who investigate how legal and institutional variables influence loan 
characteristics including the presence of collateral. 
  To further address the validity of the results, we use an alternative measure 
for bank competition in our estimations. Following the wide utilization of 
concentration indices in the literature, we take an indicator of bank concentration 
as a natural robustness check, even if we are fully aware of the limitations of such 
indices as mentioned above. Bank concentration is measured by the assets of the 
three largest banks as a share of all commercial banks (Concentration). 
Information comes again from the Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2000)’s 
database. Table 4 displays the estimations with bank concentration. We observe a 
positive coefficient for Concentration, which is significant in three of the four 
specifications, meaning that bank concentration favors the presence of collateral. 
Therefore, these results corroborate those obtained with the Lerner index. 
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Table 3.   Main regressions 
 
Logit regressions for Collateral. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Standard 
errors are clustered by borrower and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for 
industries and years are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 








































































Creditor rights  0.168*** 
(0.063) 
– –  0.101* 
(0.058) 
Rule of law  -0.021 
(0.165) 
– –  -0.297*** 
(0.078) 
Log  likelihood  -2523.386 -2593.451  -2531.529 -2575.678 
Pseudo R²  0.2617  0.2412  0.2593  0.2464 




Table 4.   Robustness tests: with bank concentration 
 
Logit regressions for Collateral. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Standard 
errors are clustered by borrower and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for 
industries and years are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 








































































Creditor rights  0.276*** 
(0.062) 
– –  0.237*** 
(0.055) 
Rule of law  -0.543*** 
(0.158) 
– –  -0.504*** 
(0.078) 
Likelihood  ratio  -2577.762 -2660.082  -2619.637 -2604.182 
Pseudo R²  0.2458  0.2217  0.2335  0.2381 




Another source of skepticism might concern Dealscan database, which includes 
many syndicated loans. Consequently, the loan can be granted by a syndicate of 
banks from different countries, which might make it hard to consider the degree of 
competition of one country as relevant to explain the use of collateral. However, 
investigating the sample shows that a large number of banks involved in the 
syndicated loans are domestic banks. Without meaning that all lenders are 
domestic, it stresses the fact that bank competition at the domestic level clearly 
matters. From the perspective of syndicated loans practitioners (Taylor and 
Sansone, 2007), the strong implication of domestic banks in syndicated loans is in 
line with, on the one hand, the fact that the arrangers are usually relationship 
banks, which are generally local banks with respect to the borrower’s country 
(Esty, 2001), and, on the other hand, the fact that the presence of local lenders 
reduces problems related to information asymmetries (Sufi, 2007). Nevertheless, 
we perform additional estimations to check whether our findings are dependent of 
the presence of syndicated loans. In this aim, we keep only single-lender loans, 
resulting in a strong reduction of the sample size. The loan sample then includes 
1173 loans from 43 countries. The results of these estimations are reported in 
table 5. Once again, we find that bank competition exerts a positive and 
significant impact on the use of collateral. The only changes concern the 
significance of some country-level control variables. Therefore, in spite of the 
limitations of Dealscan database, these additional points support the relevance of 
our results. 
  Our findings have thus survived several robustness checks, leading to the 
strong support of our theoretical prediction that a loan is more likely to be secured 
if competition is lower in the banking industry. 
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Table 5.   Robustness tests: single-lender loans only 
 
Logit regressions for Collateral. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Standard 
errors are clustered by borrower and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for 
industries and years are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 
































































Creditor rights  -0.0186 
(0.149) 
- -  0.025 
(0.134) 
Rule of law  -0.4349 
(0.308) 
- -  -0.367** 
(0.157) 
Likelihood  ratio  -523.067 -531.747  -524.786 -526.189 
Pseudo R²  0.3214  0.3101  0.3192  0.3173 




4 Concluding  remarks 
We investigate how bank competition influences the use of collateral. This 
question is of major interest to assess the implications of the structural changes of 
the banking industry on the access to bank finance, owing to the dependence of 
this access to collateral requirements. 
  We construct a theoretical model incorporating information asymmetries in a 
spatial competition framework. Banks can choose between screening the borrower 
or asking collateral in the loan contract. Screening becomes more expensive as the 
distance between a bank and a firm increases. We show that increased 
competition in the banking industry makes the use of collateral in loan contracts 
less likely, by making the choice for screening more attractive. The model thus 
predicts that bank competition lowers the presence of collateral in loan contracts. 
  In order to check this theoretical prediction, we develop an empirical cross-
country analysis based on the regression of the presence of collateral on bank 
competition measured by the Lerner index. As predicted by the model, our tests 
provide evidence on a negative impact of bank competition on the presence of 
collateral. Robustness checks confirm this finding with alternative specifications. 
Thus our paper shows that presence of collateral is more likely when bank 
competition is lower. As a consequence, the effects of bank competition on loan 
rates and on collateral use are complementary for the access to bank finance, as 
the reduction of loan rates is accompanied by lower collateral requirements. This 
conclusion is in line with the finding of Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2004) that greater bank concentration fosters financing obstacles. Thus, taking 
measures that increase bank competition should improve the firms’ access to 
finance. With more competition, a firm’s asset endowment becomes a less 
important prerequisite for getting a loan. In particular, in less developed countries 
where the types of assets that can potentially be pledged as collateral are limited 
and therefore firms find it difficult to get a loan competition in the banking sector 
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
 
From (IC.BF_L) we know that L = I. Moreover, the participation constraint of the 
good firm must hold 
 
A ) I A )( p 1 ( ) R X A ( p
L ≥ − − + − +  or 
0 I ) p 1 ( ) R X ( p
L ≥ − − −    (PC.GF_L) 
 
If the project is successful, a good firm repays R
L from the payoff X it generates. 
In the case of failure, collateralized assets in the amount of I are seized by the 
bank. The expected payoff when the investment is credit-financed has to be at 
least as high as the payoff from not investing (which is A). 
  The bank will participate if it makes at least zero expected profit with the 
contract offered. The bank’s expected profit by each (good) firm is given by 
 
0 I I ) p 1 ( pR
L ≥ − − α +  (PC.B_L) 
 
which implies that it needs a repayment of at least R
L. Since both banks are 
identical they cannot demand a higher repayment without losing all their 
customers.     Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
 
Bank 1 undertakes the following consideration. According to bank 2’s 
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⎛ − + − +  (PC.F_S) 
 
According to the participation constraint, the good firm must be better off by 
being able to realize the project and generate a return X and repay R
S than by not 
investing and getting the outside option of A. We have assumed that this is the 
case. Bank 1 does not have an incentive to demand a higher repayment because it  
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would loose the firm to its competitor. By demanding 
S
2 R  bank 1 receives an 
expected profit per borrower of:  dc 2
N
c S − = Π . Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
 
Bank 1 offers a screening contract and bank 2 a collateralized contract. Given the 
offer bank 2 needs to break even, bank 1 can demand a repayment of 
SL
1 R  without 
losing the firm as a customer 
 
p
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Bank 1’s expected profit per borrower with this repayment is 
 
cd I ) 1 )( p 1 (
SL
1 − α − − = Π  
 
And bank 2 makes zero expected profit. Bank 1’s expected profit is non-negative 
if 
c
) 1 )( p 1 ( I
d
α − −
≤ . For firms located further away, bank 2 has lower costs of 
producing information than bank 1. This means that bank 2 can make a more 
attractive offer to the firm than bank 1. Firms are indifferent between the 
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In this case bank 1 makes zero expected profit because bank 2 serves all 
customers from this location and the bank gets a profit per borrower of 
I ) 1 )( p 1 ( cd
SL




Proof of Lemma 4: 
 
Suppose bank 1 offers a collateralized contract and bank 2 a screening contract. A 











































+ =  and L = I. The resulting profit per borrower of bank 1 










⎛ − = Π .   Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
We want to derive the Nash equilibrium. To do so, we first compare the best 
answers of bank 1 (bank 2) given the offer of bank 2 (bank 1). 
 
Best answers of bank 1 
–  Provided bank 2 offers a collateralized contract: 
 Since  0
L SL
1 = Π > Π , bank 1’s best response is to offer a screening contract if 
c





= ≤  . For firms located further away bank 1 is indifferent 
between screening and collateralization because both contracts yield zero 
expected profits. 
–  Provided bank 2 offers a screening contract: 
  Bank 1 compares Π
S and 
LS
1 Π . Its payoff with a screening contract is higher 
for all 
c





= ≤  and therefore it offers a screening contract to all 
firms that are relatively close. To all other firms bank 1 offers a collateralized 
contract. 
 
Best answers of bank 2 
–  Provided bank 1 offers a collateralized contract: 
  Bank 2 will always make zero expected profits independently of the contract 
it offers. Therefore, it is indifferent between the type of contract offered.  
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–  Provided bank 1 offers a screening contract: 
  Bank 2 compares 
LS
1 Π  and Π

















d  the profit is higher with a screening 
contract. For those further away bank 2 offers a collateralized contract. 
 
Due to the assumption that  I ) 1 )( p 1 (
N 4
c
α − − < , the threshold values can be 
ranked as  d
~




d ≤  
–  Given that bank 2 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 1 chooses a 
screening contract. 
–  Given that bank 2 chooses a screening contract, bank 1 chooses a screening 
contract as well. 
–  Given that bank 1 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 2 is indifferent 
between a screening and a collateralized contract. 
–  Given that bank 1 chooses a screening contract, bank 2 chooses a screening 
contract as well. 
The Nash equilibrium is that both banks offer a screening contract. 
 
2.  d ˆ d d
~
< <  
–  Given that bank 2 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 1 is indifferent 
between a screening and a collateralized contract. 
–  Given that bank 2 chooses a screening contract, bank 1 chooses a 
collateralized contract. 
–  Given that bank 1 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 2 is indifferent 
between a screening and a collateralized contract. 
–  Given that bank 1 chooses a screening contract, bank 2 chooses a screening 
contract as well. 
Thus, bank 1 weakly prefers a collateralized contract and bank 2 weakly prefers a 
screening contract. In equilibrium, firms are offered a collateralized contract by 






d d ˆ < <  
–  Given that bank 2 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 1 is indifferent 
between a screening and a collateralized contract. 
–  Given that bank 2 chooses a screening contract, bank 1 chooses a 
collateralized contract.  
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–  Given that bank 1 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 2 is indifferent 
between a screening and a collateralized contract.  
–  Given that bank 1 chooses a screening contract, bank 2 chooses a 
collateralized contract. 
Thus, both banks weakly prefers a collateralized contract. In equilibrium, firms 
are financed by a collateralized contract by bank 1.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
 




































As a result, the fraction of firms financed through a screening contract increases 




BANK OF FINLAND RESEARCH 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
ISSN 0785-3572, print; ISSN 1456-6184, online 
 
1/2008  Peik Granlund  Regulatory choices in global financial markets – restoring 
the role of aggregate utility in the shaping of market supervision. 2008. 
36 p. ISBN 978-952-462-416-9, print; ISBN 978-952-462-417-6, online. 
 
2/2008  Ari Hyytinen – Tuomas Takalo  Consumer awareness and the use of 
payment media: evidence from Young Finnish consumers. 2008. 34 p. 
ISBN 978-952-462-418-3, print; ISBN 978-952-462-419-0, online. 
 
3/2008  Patrick M Crowley  One money, several cycles? Evaluation of European 
business cycles using model-based cluster analysis. 2008. 47 p. 
ISBN 978-952-462-420-6, print; ISBN 978-952-462-421-3, online. 
 
4/2008  József Molnár  Market power and merger simulation in retail banking. 
2008. 26 p. ISBN 978-952-462-422-0, print; ISBN 978-952-462-423-7, online. 
 
5/2008 Heli  Huhtala    Along but beyond mean-variance: Utility maximization in a 
semimartingale model. 2008. 29 p. ISBN 978-952-462-426-8, print; 
ISBN 978-952-462-427-5, online. 
 
6/2008  Mikael Juselius  Cointegration implications of linear rational expectation 
models. 2008. 25 p. ISBN 978-952-462-428-2, print; ISBN 978-952-462-429-9, 
online. 
 
7/2008  Tuomas Takalo – Tanja Tanayama – Otto Toivanen  Evaluating innovation 
policy: a structural treatment effect model of R&D subsidies. 2008. 59 p. 
ISBN 978-952-462-430-5, print; ISBN 978-952-462-431-2, online. 
 
8/2008  Essi Eerola – Niku Määttänen  On the importance of borrowing constraints 
for house price dynamics. 2008. 40 p. ISBN 978-952-462-432-9, print; ISBN 
978-952-462-433-6, online. 
 
9/2008  Marko Melolinna  Using financial markets information to identify oil supply 
shocks in a restricted VAR. 2008. 35 p. ISBN 978-952-462-434-3, print; 
ISBN 978-952-462-435-0, online. 
 
10/2008  Bill B Francis – Iftekhar Hasan – James R Lothian – Xian Sun  The signalling 
hypothesis revisited: Evidence from foreign IPOs. 2008. 41 p.  
ISBN 978-952-462-436-7, print; ISBN 978-952-462-437-4, online. 
  
11/2008  Kari Takala – Matti Viren  Efficiency and costs of payments: some new 
evidence from Finland. 2008. 50 p. ISBN 978-952-462-438-1, print; ISBN 
978-952-462-439-8, online. 
 
12/2008 Jukka  Topi    Bank runs, liquidity and credit risk. 2008. 31 p. 
  ISBN 978-952-462-440-4, print; ISBN 978-952-462-441-1, online. 
 
13/2008  Juha Kilponen – Matti Viren  Why do growth rates differ? Evidence from 
cross-country data on private sector production. 2008. 29 p. 
  ISBN 978-952-462-442-8, print; ISBN 978-952-462-443-5, online. 
 
14/2008  Bill B Francis – Iftekhar Hasan – Delroy M Hunter  Does hedging tell the full 
story? Reconciling differences in US aggregate and industry-level exchange 
rate risk premia. 2008. 58 p. ISBN 978-952-462-444-2, print; 
 ISBN  978-952-462-445-9,  online. 
 
15/2008  Leonardo Becchetti – Annalisa Castelli – Iftekhar Hasan  Investment-cash 
flow sensitivities, credit rationing and financing constraints. 2008. 64 p. 
ISBN 978-952-462-446-6, print; ISBN 978-952-462-447-3, online. 
 
16/2008  Maritta Paloviita  Estimating open economy Phillips curves for the euro area 
with directly measured expectations. 2008. 37 p. ISBN 978-952-462-448-0, 
print; ISBN 978-952-462-449-7, online. 
 
17/2008  Esa Jokivuolle – Kimmo Virolainen – Oskari Vähämaa  Macro-mode-based 
stress testing of Basel II capital requirements. 2008. 27 p. 
  ISBN 978-952-462-450-3, print; ISBN 978-952-462-451-0, online. 
 
18/2008  Mika Vaihekoski  History of finance research and education in Finland: the 
first thirty years. 2008. 41 p. ISBN 978-952-462-452-7, print; 
 ISBN  978-952-462-453-4,  online. 
 
19/2008  Tuomas Takalo – Tanja Tanayama  Adverse selection and financing of 
innovation: is there a need for R&D subsidies? 2008. 41 p. 
  ISBN 978-952-462-454-1, print; ISBN 978-952-462-455-8, online. 
 
20/2008  Efrem Castelnuovo – Luciano Greco – Davide Raggi  Estimating regime-
switching Taylor rules with trend inflation. 2008. 40 p.  
  ISBN 978-952-462-456-5, print; ISBN 978-952-462-457-2, online. 
 
21/2008  Helvi Kinnunen  Government funds and demographic transition – 
alleviating ageing costs in a small open economy. 2008. 39 p. 
  ISBN 978-952-462-458-9, print; ISBN 978-952-462-459-6, online. 
  
 
22/2008  Kari Kemppainen  Integrating European retail payment systems: some 
economics of SEPA. 2008. 43 p. ISBN 978-952-462-460-2, print; 
ISBN 978-952-462-461-9, online. 
 
23/2008  Paolo Zagaglia  Money-market segmetation in the euro area: what has 
changed during the turmoil? 2008. 24 p. ISBN 978-952-462-462-6, print; 
ISBN 978-952-462-463-3, online. 
 
24/2008 Massimiliano  Marzo – Paolo Zagaglia  Determinancy of interest rate rules 
with bond transaction services in a cashless economy. 2008. 36 p. 
  ISBN 978-952-462-464-0, print; ISBN 978-952-462-465-7, online. 
 
25/2008  Massimiliano Marzo – Silvia Romagnoli – Paolo Zagaglia  A continuous-time 
model of the term structure of interest rates with fiscal-monetary policy 
interactions. 2008. 35 p. ISBN 978-952-462-466-4, print; 
 ISBN  978-952-462-467-1,  online. 
 
26/2008  Fabrizio Spargoli – Paolo Zagaglia  The co-movements along the forward 
curve of natural gas futures: a structural view. 2008. 32 p.  
  ISBN 978-952-462-468-8, print; ISBN 978-952-462-469-5, online. 
 
27/2008  Christa Hainz – Laurent Weill – Christophe J Godlewski  Bank competition 
and collateral: theory and evidence. 2008. 37 p. ISBN 978-952-462-474-9, 
print; ISBN 978-952-462-475-6, online. 
 
 
 
 
 Suomen Pankki
Bank of Finland
P.O.Box 160
FI-00101 HELSINKI
Finland